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Abstract: Few events give the opportunity to observe the full range of human
behavior as wars do. In the case of civil wars in ethnically-mixed societies, the
distribution of violence across various segments of the population can provide
evidence on the extent and nature of discrimination. As in the case of markets,
identifying discrimination in the warplace is challenging. There is uncertainty on
the reconstruction of events as well as the rationale behind the violence. We use a
unique data set collected by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
on war crimes during the 1980’s to show that there is evidence of taste-based
discrimination by agents of the state towards ethnic minorities and women. The
evidence is robust to diﬀerent assumptions on the logic of repression and missing
data problems.
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1. Introduction
Colonial rule and slavery has left a legacy of discrimination and exclusion. They
are thought to be at the root of persistent inequality in the developing world.
Sadly, the press is filled with reports of ethnic conflict and ethnic cleansing and
with evidence that social status is stubbornly correlated with ethnic background.
This paper discusses the identification of discrimination from patterns of human
right violations committed by agents of the state trying to quelch social unrest.
Identifying the source of discrimination from observational data on political vi-
olence is not any easier than identifying the source of discrimination in labor
markets. Civil wars, however, allow us to observe interactions among populations
that do not normally interact with one another, and this helps us to more clearly
identify discrimination. The recent work of Truth Commissions trying to iden-
tify the extent of human right violations in countries with civil wars shows how
unequal is the distribution of violence towards poor and indigeneous populations.
This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to look at the nature of that unequal
treatment.
There is a large literature addressing the issue of discrimination in labor mar-
kets. Riach and Rich (2002) review the literature on audit studies conducted
in many places. The general finding is that across a variety of markets there is
evidence of discrimination based on race and gender.1 However, as discussed by
Heckman (1998), a problem with audit studies is that it is diﬃcult to control for
the distribution of unobservables. It is possible that diﬀerences in the dispersion
of unobserved factors related to productivity vary across race and gender. This
might mask the presence of taste-based discrimination in some cases and generate
the appearance of discrimination among subjects based on observables.
More closely related to this paper is the literature on discrimination in police
searches. Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) discusses identification strategies
using data on police searches of drivers. They show that taste-based discrimination
can be detected if the probability of being guilty given search varies with race. The
authors exploit the fact that if the police oﬃcers are homogeneous and risk neutral,
they should invest their manpower to the point where the returns of searching a
white driver or black driver are equal. Antonovics and Brown (2007) show that
taste-based discrimination might be hidden if returns to searches and crime are
diﬀerent across the race of the police oﬃcer. They show that the probability of
1In a more recent study, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) find that those with black-
sounding names tend to be discriminated against in a study using fake resumes.
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search given the driver’s race should be constant conditional on the race of the
police oﬃcer. The key identifying assumption of their model is that drivers are
randomly matched to a police oﬃcer. In the absence of that, it is not possible
to identify discrimination based on searches conditional on the race of the oﬃcer.
Anwar and Fang (2006) present an alternative test of discrimination based on
the ordering of search intensity and the probability of finding a person guilty
given search. They show that in the absence of statistical discrimination the
patterns of search and guilt given search must not depend on the race of the oﬃcer.
Dominitz and Knowles (2006) argue that tests of discrimination are not robust
to the rationale behind the actions of the police. They show that if the motive
of the police is to minimize crime rather than maximize successful searches then
tests of discrimination must rely on non-testable hypotheses on the distribution
of propensities to commit crime.
This paper discusses how these theoretical results can be used to test for the
nature of discrimination during political violence. Our basic theoretical result
is that under similar conditions and facing a similar population, it must not be
the case that if an agent of the state searches a group more intensely they find
more guilty people per search. The number of guilty people per search must be
decreasing in search. Evidence counter to this cannot be reconciled with theories of
statistical discrimination. We also exploit periods of martial law, during which the
cost of search decreases for all agents, to further test for taste-based discrimination.
The Truth and Reconciliation data on the 1980’s Peruvian civil uprising pro-
vides an excellent opportunity to test these ideas. Peru is an ethnically diverse
country with close to 20% of its population claiming Indigeneous languages as their
mother tongue. Due to several waves of migration, the population also claims Eu-
ropean, Asian and African heritage. In Peru, being poor and being Indian are
thought to be synonymous (see de la Cadena, 2000), so we can use ethnicity to
proxy for income. Social divisions in the country are manifested in the composition
of the diﬀerent Armed forces. The Navy and Air Force have always been associ-
ated with upper and upper-middle classes, while the Army and the Police are
primarily composed of people with middle and lower-middle class backgrounds.
Most importantly, the civil conflict placed these diﬀerent groups in the poorest
and more distant areas of the country. This provides an ideal situation to observe
the nature of discrimination because groups that might not normally interact with
each other did. During the conflict, certain areas of the country were under almost
exclusive control by a select few of the Armed Forces.
We show that the distribution of violence in Peru during the period of civil
2
unrest cannot be solely reconciled with statistical theories of discrimination. While
violence on the part of the Armed Forces was widespread, in areas where violence
was most intense, the behavior of the Army, Navy and Police towards non-Spanish
speakers, especially women, is not consistent with statistical discrimination. These
results are shown to hold even after we account for the problem of missing covariate
data, which is particularly severe in this data set.
The next section presents the theoretical framework. A brief description of
the data is given later. The subsequent sections present the results and test their
robustness to missing covariate data problem. We then conclude.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
This section starts with a version of Knowles, Persico and Todd’s (2001) model
of discrimination to derive testable hypotheses of taste-based discrimination. We
introduce an alternative specification that might be relevant for the case of repres-
sion of political violence. Also, we discuss alternative models (versions of Anwar
and Fang, 2005, and Dominitz and Knowles, 2006, models) and their hypotheses
on taste-based discrimination.
A person in group i compares the benefit of joining a violent group, vi, against
the cost of being punished, θsi. A person joins a violent group (and perform tasks
for it) if
vi ≥ θsi
where vi is private information drawn from a known distribution Fi. Agents of
the state do not observe whether any particular person in group i is guilty and
therefore searches anyone with equal probability, si. Agents of the state discover
guilt after search with certainty, but are only able to punish with probability θ
∈ (0, 1]. θ represents an institutional parameter determining how much freedom
agents of the state have to punish. For example, during periods of martial law,
the rules of law are relaxed and agents have greater freedom to punish, θ = 1,
however, during normal times θ < 1. The existence of this parameter will be
important to our identification strategy. Given these incentives, the likelikood
that a person in group i is guilty is Pr(G|i) = 1− Fi(θsi).
An agent of the state maximizes the number of guilty people punished. That
is, an agent will search a person in group i if the cost of searching that person, τ i,
is below the expected gain,
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θPr(G|i) ≥ τ i.
The expression shows that incentives to perform searches increase with the
likelihood that a guilty person is punished, θ. An agent of the state will choose
a probability an individual in group i is searched, si, diﬀerent from 0 or 1 if
θPr(G|i) = τ i. That is, in equilibrium, we will have that,
θ(1− F (θsi)) = τ i
This expression implies that the probability of a person being guilty increases
with the cost of search of group i, τ i. This also implies that if the cost of search
does not vary across groups (τ i = τ j, all i, j), the proportion of people punished
given search should be constant across groups. This expression also implies that
even if institutional changes allow θ to increase (e.g., agents of the state are
allowed to punish more freely), the proportion of people punished given search
should remain constant. Following previous literature, we will consider that an
agent taste-base discriminates if τ i 6= τ j.
Since repression is expected to be carried out by diﬀerent agents of the state
(say the Army might have better training in certain areas than the Navy), one
might consider the possibility that search costs vary across agents of the state but
not across groups. If this is the case, we will have that θ(1−Fi(θsArmyi )) = τ
Army
i
and θ(1− Fi(θsNavyi )) = τ
Navy
i for all groups i. That is, the proportion of people
being punished given search is expected to be constant for each agent of the state,
but may be diﬀerent across agents of the state. This is consistent with statistical
discrimination. Note also that because both agents of the state face the same
institutional constraints, θ, it must be the case that those agents searching more
intensely are the ones who punish guilty people less frequently.
Anwar and Fang (2005) present an alternative model of discrimination that
does not reject statistical discrimination even if variation in search and guilt given
search varies across groups for each agent of the state. The authors, however, show
that a simple pattern of behavior must be observed, for a given θ, if agents of the
state do not taste-base discriminate. Agents with larger cost of search should
search less and punish/convict more given search. This test require comparisons
across agents of the state for a given institutional setting θ, or across institutional
settings, θ and θ0, for a given agent of the state.
Recently Dominitz and Knowles (2006) have called into question the premise
behind the models of discrimination based on Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001).
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The authors consider the case in which an agent of the state’s objective is to
minimize crime and not to maximize succesful searches. This point is particularly
relevant for the case of political uprising where one might think that agents of
the state try not only to capture guilty people but to discourage participation in
violent activities. An adaptation of Dominitz and Knowles’ (2006) model to our
context suggests that agents of the state solve the following problem:
maxsi
P
i−(1− Fi(esi))ηiαi
subject toP
i esiηipi ≤ θY
where esi = θsi, ηi is the size of the population in group i, pi is the cost of
searching group i, and Y is a resource constraint. The parameter αi denotes a
taste for searching group i, or a source of taste-based discrimination. However, the
model shows that diﬀerential costs of searching a group, pi, might also represent
discrimination. Since esi is increasing in θ, increasing the probability of punishing
guilty people works as an income eﬀect on search. Dominitz and Knowles (2006)
show that even if pi = pj for all i, j, it is in general not possible to derive non-
parametric tests of discrimination without imposing non-testable hypotheses on
the distribution F . While this is true, it is clear that if diﬀerent agents of the
state face the same group i for a given institutional constraint, θ, it must be
that those agents searching a group more intensely must also find fewer people
guilty and therefore must punish that group less frequently. In addition, it can
be shown that the model does not have testable hypothesis across institutional
constraints, θ’s. The term θ(1− Fi(esi(θ))), with esi(θ) being the optimal solution
to the crime minimization problem, can increase or decrease with θ even whenesi(θ) is increasing in θ.2
In summary, the models in this section yield the following predictions. Knowles,
Persico and Todd (2001) predict that the probability of being found guilty given
search should be constant for a given agent across groups and across institutional
constraints, θ and θ0. Anwar and Fang (2005) predict that if agents diﬀer only in
their search costs, then the probability of search must be inversely related to that
cost and the probability of being found guilty given search must be directly related,
holding the group constant. This result also holds across institutional constraints.
Finally, Dominitz and Knowles’ (2006) model of crime minimization implies that
2This is possible because the reduction in crime must be smaller than an increase in the
likelihood of punishment. We have not found general restrictions on F , say log-concavity, that
would imply that this term always be increasing or decreasing in θ.
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holding an institutional constraint, θ, constant, agents of the state who search a
group more intensely must also find fewer guilty people per search. This result
does not necessarily holds across institutional constraints. The following sections
will discuss assumptions necessary to make these tests implementable.
3. Methodology
The models above suggest that the ideal data to test for discrimination must
include the proportion of people found guilty of terrorism given that they were
searched by an agent of the state. Unfortunately, no such data exist. The next
best measure of guilt is the number of people killed extrajudicially by agents of the
state and the number of people currently missing and last seen in the custody of
the agent. From now on, we will refer to these two cases as killing.3 Our measure
of search is if a citizen reported any act perpetrated by any agent of the state.
This measure include reports on imprisonment and interrogation. The data do
not tell us if a citizen was briefly stopped and let go.
The previous section suggests some tests of discrimination. For a person of
group i, let yi be equal to 1 if a person is guilty of committing acts of terrorism
and 0 otherwise, and let j, k denote the agent to whom an intervention has been
attributed. θ is the probability that a guilty person is punished, and let s be equal
to 1 if a person is searched and 0 otherwise.
The first test of discrimination is that:
E[θyi|j, θ, s = 1] = E[θ0yi|k, θ0, s = 1] for all i, j, k, θ, θ0
That is, if all agents of the states have the same cost of search, they must
equalize the return per search if they are maximizing successful searches. If
diﬀerent agents of the state have diﬀerent search costs, the test requires that:
E[θyi|j, θ, s = 1] = E[θ0yi|j, θ0, s = 1] for all i, k, θ, θ0
Under weaker assumptions, as in Anwar and Fang (2005), the test can be
modified as follows:
3Rarely would any agent of the state ever say that killings were made without a good reason
(on average). This paper is therefore not about whether human rights violation occured, which is
clear from the data, but whether human rights violations reveal distate for a particular segment
of the population.
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Either E[si|j, θ] ≤ E[si|k, θ0] and E[θyi|j, θ, s = 1] ≥ E[θ0yi|k, θ0, s = 1] for all i, j, k, θ, θ0
or E[si|j, θ] ≥ E[si|k, θ0] and E[θyi|j, θ, s = 1] ≤ E[θ0yi|k, θ0, s = 1] for all i, j, k, θ, θ0
This test says that agents with lower search cost must search more intensely
and therefore find fewer people guilty. This ranking must hold across institutional
constraints. That is, holding a group constant, more intense search must be
associated with less successful search.
Finally, assuming that agents of the state minimize crime rather than successful
search, as in Dominitz and Knowles (2006), further relaxes the conditions for
detecting taste-based discrimination:
Either E[si|j, θ] ≤ E[si|k, θ] and E[yi|j, θ, s = 1] ≥ E[yi|k, θ, s = 1] for all i, j, k, θ
or E[si|j, θ] ≥ E[si|k, θ] and E[yi|j, θ, s = 1] ≤ E[yi|k, θ, s = 1] for all i, j, k, θ
This test says that the ranking of searches and successful searches must hold
only for a given group and a given institutional constraint, θ, across agents of the
state.
The covariate data we use is sex and mother language (i.e. Spanish or non-
Spanish). Mother language is highly correlated with social status and ethnicity.
The mother language of indigenous people is not Spanish.
In our analysis, we look at the extent and nature of discrimination. To look at
the extent of discrimination, we look at diﬀerential treatment in the probability of
being killed, E[y|i, j, θ], and the probability of being searched, E[s|i, j, θ], during
periods of martial law and during normal times. The probability of being killed is
calculated by taking the number of observations of people killed with covariates
i by agent j in time period t (i.e. martial law or not) in a particular district and
weighing it by the population in 1981 of people with covariates i in that district.4
The probability of being searched is calculated in the same fashion, but we use
the number of people reporting an act, instead of the number of people killed.
The probability calculation only includes the districts in which a particular agent
of the state was active.5 Agents were often only active in certain districts, so this
gives more accurate comparisons across agents.
4Peru is made up of 24 departments, and departments in Peru are divided up into provinces.
Provinces are further divided up into districts.
5We do not include in the denominator population counts of districts in which the agent was
not active.
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To look at the nature of discrimination, we test whether behavior is consistent
with the models of statistical discrimination presented above. If our tests do not
hold, this suggests taste-based discrimination. To calculate the probability of
being killed given search, E[θy|i, j, θ, s = 1], we count the number of observations
of people killed with covariates i by agent j in time period t (i.e. martial law
or not) in a particular district and weight it by the number of observations of
acts reported by people with covariates i by agent j in time period t (i.e. martial
law or not) in that district. In our empirical analysis, we look across regions,
so probabilities by district are averaged across all districts in that region. This
applies to all calculated probabilities.
The following sections present the data and results.
4. Overview of the Data
The data we use are from the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
from the 1981 Peruvian Census. The former data were gathered as the Commis-
sion travelled around the country during 2001-2003 and invited victims, survivors,
family members and neighbors to report any acts of violence during the period
of 1980-2000. Acts of violence include killing, disappearance, torture, detention,
and rape. The majority of violent acts fall under the category of killing and dis-
appearance, and it is those reported acts that we focus our analysis on. Since
the data are only reported acts, the data are considered a lower bound measure
on the number of violent acts that occurred during 1980-2000. Each act includes
subrecords detailing if a person was detained, tortured, disappeared, etc. Our
measure of search is the total number of separate acts and our measure of “suc-
cess” is the proportion of those acts that ended up in extrajudicial execution or
disapperance. Note that a large portion of the data has missing covariate data
(e.g. on level of education and age), but the sex of the individual is typically
always known.6 While the collected data span from 1980-2000, we restrict the
data to the period 1980-1993 when the terrorist movement was at its strongest.7
We use district-level census data from 1981 broken down by sex and language
6The data set of acts we use in this paper is a subsample of all registered acts. We do
this because this subsample has been cross-validated and therefore is less likely to suﬀer from
measurement problems.
7The nature of the terrorist movement changed dramatically in 1993 with the capture of the
leader of Shining Path, Abigail Guzman, the previous year and the suspension of the democratic
regime.
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(i.e. Spanish or non-Spanish speaker) to establish diﬀerential treatment across
groups. Census data for language are available for all departments in Peru but
two (Apurimac and San Martin). These departments are excluded from our es-
timations of killings and search weighted by population data. While we do not
have population data from these departments, the Truth and Reconciliation data
do contain observations from these departments. The results of our tests for dis-
crimination using the probability of being killed given search do not change by
the inclusion of these departments.
Another important element in our analysis is the identification of periods of
martial law, or as they are called in Peru, states of emergency. A state of emer-
gency means that the state cannot guarantee a citizen’s rights and agents of the
state are given more political power. During these periods, we would expect an
increase in the number of human rights violations. Through the course of the
political violence in Peru, there were various states of emergency, both at the
national and regional level. We have classified each event from the T&R data as
having occurred during a state of emergency or not based on where and when the
event took place. For instance, according to the compilation of states of emer-
gency made by Landa (1995), the department of Ayacucho and Huancavelica were
under state of emergency 38% of the time. In our data, 74% of the incidents of
violence attributed to the Army, Navy and Police occurred during states of emer-
gency. Similarly, the departments of Huanuco, Loreto and Ucayali were under
state of emergency 28% of the time, and 58% of the registered incidents occurred
during states of emergency.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission roughly divides agents of the state
into the three main Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the Police.
We concentrate our analysis on the Army, Navy and Police since these were the
groups most involved in the political violence.
The Final Report (Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004)
states that the total number of people killed during the eighties and early nineties
might have reached 70,000. The majority of the cases are attributable to Shining
Path, a terrorist group behind the uprising. Approximately 30,000 are believed to
be the responsibility of agents of the state.8
8The Truth and Reconciliation Commission arrived at this conclusion using much-debated
statistical methods. The actual number of casualties recorded is about 30,000. This paper only
uses reported cases, i.e., cases with a paper trail.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Types of Crimes Committed and Demographics by Perpetrators
State Terrorists
Killed 29.1% 69.9%
Killed and Missing 49.0% 75.4%
Tortured 38.4% 12.7%
Men 77.1% 78.1%
Primary Education∗ 16.0% 19.9%
Non-Spanish Speakers∗ 68.6% 73.6%
∗ as percentage of observed
Table 2 shows a brief summary of the types of crimes committed and the
demographic composition of the victims. Terrorist groups were more prone to
killing than agents of the state. Two thirds of those coming across terrorists were
killed, more than twice the probability corresponding to agents of the state. There
are a large number of cases of missing people, and while these people are not
classified as killed, this is most likely because there was no body found to verify
that the person was killed.9 To be more inclusive with the number of people
most likely killed during the terrorist movement, we combine killed and missing
together to have a broader measure.10 All the analysis in the paper uses this
combined classification. Also, as Table 2 shows, most of the victims were men
and non-Spanish speakers.
9For example, many people were killed during the violence and their bodies were thrown into
rivers. It was impossible to find the bodies or identify them. So, while the person may have
actually been killed, he or she would be classifed as missing in our data.
10No person was classified as both killed and missing in the Truth and Reconciliation data.
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Table 3
Percentage of the Population in 1981
Reporting a case by Agent of the State
Department Army Navy Police
Amazonas 0.03% 0.04%
Ancash 0.02% 0.05% 0.12%
Arequipa 0.02%
Ayacucho 0.67% 0.15% 0.32%
Cajamarca 0.14%
Cusco 0.03% 0.08%
Huancavelica 0.10% 0.13%
Huanuco 0.32% 0.10%
Ica 0.30% 0.03% 0.07%
Junin 0.14% 0.01% 0.07%
La Libertad 0.11% 0.08%
Lambayeque 0.01% 0.17%
Lima 0.01% 0.01%
Loreto 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Pasco 0.08% 0.03% 0.35%
Piura 0.16% 0.05%
Puno 0.13% 0.28%
Ucayali 0.09% 0.10% 0.03%
Table 3 shows that the intensity of involvement of diﬀerent agents was not the
same during the civil war in Peru.11 Table 3 shows a sample of the departments
that suﬀered from terrorism and the variance in the data. For example, on average,
a person was four times more likely of having an encounter with the Army than
having an encounter with the Navy in Ayacucho. And, a person was twice as
likely of having an encounter with the Army than with the Police in the same
department. However, in Ucayali, the Army and the Navy were involved in similar
number of cases. While this is informative, it is an imperfect measure of searches
by diﬀerent agents of the state because we do not have data on the number of
agents of the state in each region during the conflict.
11The numerator is the number of cases attributed to an agent of the state and the denominator
is the population in 1981 in the areas where the agent was active.
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5. Testing for Discrimination
We look first at diﬀerential treatment of various groups by agents of the state.
Second, we examine if diﬀerential treatment is consistent with statistical discrim-
ination.
5.1. Extent of Discrimination
We start first by looking at diﬀerential treatment in the probability of being killed
and the probability of search given covariates by various agents of the state. Table
4 shows the probability of being killed for the two regions in which terrorist activity
was the most active. The probabilities are estimated by taking into account the
population in the area in 1981 prior to the civil war.12 Probabilities are listed
during a state of emergency and during a non-state of emergency. Recall that we
assume data were missing at random, so these are point estimates.
12We only consider the districts in which there are reported acts and aggregate up to the
regional level. So, for example, if there are three districts, in a region of 100 districts, in which
there are reported acts, we weigh those reports by the population in those districts and aggregate
up to the region. This means we are not counting population in districts in which there was no
political violence.
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Table 4
Probability of Being Killed
South Central Region: Ayacucho/Huancavelica
States of Emergency Non-States of Emergency
Army Navy Police Army Navy Police
Women, Spanish 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.000 0.012
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.000) (0.008)
Women, Non-Spanish 0.062 0.034 0.038 0.033 0.002 0.020
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Men, Spanish 0.074 0.007 0.042 0.012 0.021 0.014
(0.016) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.021) (0.008)
Men, Non-Spanish 0.269 0.070 0.177 0.135 0.052 0.067
(0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007)
Northeast Region: Ucayali/Loreto/Huanuco
States of Emergency Non-States of Emergency
Army Navy Police Army Navy Police
Women, Spanish 0.016 0.003 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.208) (0.000) (0.000)
Women, Non-Spanish 0.052 0.043 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.030) (0.000) (0.482) (0.000) (0.000)
Men, Spanish 0.091 0.033 0.013 0.081 0.028 0.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.243) (0.295) (0.202)
Men, Non-Spanish 0.277 0.326 0.058 0.185 0.137 0.019
(0.032) (0.073) (0.024) (0.533) (1.114) (0.616)
Note: standard errors in parentheses
There are notable patterns in the data. First, men are more likely to be killed
than women and non-Spanish speakers are more likely to be killed than Spanish
speakers. These diﬀerences are significant for all agents in states of emergency in
both regions.13 In non-states of emergency, this holds for all agents in the South
Central region only. Second, the Army is significantly more likely to kill any group
than the Navy in both states of emergency and non-states of emergency and in
both regions. The Army kills more non-Spanish speakers than the Police in states
of emergency in both regions.
13We use a t-test to test for diﬀerence in means for specific groups and a chi-test to do a joint
test of diﬀerence in means across several groups. Significance is measured by a p-value strictly
less than 0.10. All results noted in the text of the paper are significant.
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Comparing across periods of states of emergency and non-states of emergency,
the Army is significantly more likely to kill men and non-Spanish speaking women
in states of emergency in the South Central region. The Police also kill more men
and non-Spanish speaking women during states of emergency in the South Central
region. The Navy is significantly more likely to kill women in states of emergency
in both regions.
Table 5 shows the probability of being searched. Since we do not know the
number of searches, we measure the probability of search by any act committed
against a certain group weighted by the population in 1981.
Table 5
Probability of Being Searched
South Central Region: Ayacucho/Huancavelica
States of Emergency Non-States of Emergency
Army Navy Police Army Navy Police
Women, Spanish 0.018 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.031 0.024
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.031) (0.012)
Women, Non-Spanish 0.110 0.037 0.058 0.054 0.009 0.034
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Men, Spanish 0.107 0.021 0.059 0.038 0.021 0.036
(0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013)
Men, Non-Spanish 0.363 0.087 0.240 0.196 0.055 0.103
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Northeast Region: Ucayali/Loreto/Huanuco
States of Emergency Non-States of Emergency
Army Navy Police Army Navy Police
Women, Spanish 0.021 0.007 0.007 0.021 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Women, Non-Spanish 0.082 0.065 0.022 0.084 0.049 0.000
(0.018) (0.037) (0.015) (0.019) (0.035) (0.000)
Men, Spanish 0.122 0.052 0.028 0.104 0.052 0.020
(0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004)
Men, Non-Spanish 0.402 0.392 0.175 0.273 0.215 0.047
(0.038) (0.080) (0.041) (0.034) (0.065) (0.021)
Note: standard errors in parentheses
14
Similar patterns emerge in the probability of search. First, men are signif-
icantly more likely than women to be searched by all agents in any period of
time in both regions. Second, in states of emergency, all agents are significantly
more likely to search non-Spanish speakers than Spanish speakers in both regions.
This also holds in non-states of emergency in the Northeast region. The patterns
are less clear in the South Central region for women, but non-Spanish speaking
men are more likely to be searched than Spanish-speaking men in non-states of
emergency.
Overall, the Army is significantly more likely to search than the Police, and
the Police are more likely to search than the Navy during states of emergency and
non-states of emergency in the South Central region. These patterns also hold in
the Northeast region for both states of emergency and non-states of emergency.
Regarding levels of search across states-of-emergency and non-states-of-emergency,
all but the Navy in the Northeast region show a significant increase in the level
of activity.
Clearly, there is diﬀerential behavior towards diﬀerent groups by agents of the
state. This discrimination in behavior might be statistical or taste-based. We
turn to that next.
5.2. Nature of Discrimination
We have seen that killing and search vary by agents and characteristics of the vic-
tims. Is this diﬀerentiation due to taste-based discrimination? The theory section
makes several predictions of behavior consistent with statistical discrimination for
agents of the state. We examine this next.
Table 6 shows the probability of being killed given search for various groups
across agents of the state. First, we examine if the proportion of guilty people
given search is constant by group and state-of-emergency for a given agent of the
state in a given region. We hold the region constant for the reasons that geography
and resources change across geographical areas. The joint test that the probability
of being killed given search is the same for each group across states of emergency
is rejected for all agents of the state in the South Central region. In the Northeast
region, the Navy is the only group for which we can reject the hypothesis that the
probability of being killed given search is constant. This variation in behavior is
inconsistent with a model of discrimination where agents maximize “successful”
searches (such as Knowles, Persico and Todd, 2001). Also, it is not consistent
with a more general version of the model either (such as Anwar and Fang, 2005).
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Table 6
Probability of Being Killed Given Search
South Central Region: Ayacucho/Huancavelica
States of Emergency Non-States of Emergency
Army Navy Police Army Navy Police
Women, Spanish 25.00 100.00 50.00 100.00 0.00 50.00
(21.65) (0.00) (35.36) (0.00) (0.00) (25.00)
Women, Non-Spanish 55.79 90.63 66.33 60.64 25.00 60.42
(3.25) (5.15) (4.77) (5.04) (21.65) (7.06)
Men, Spanish 68.75 33.33 71.43 30.00 100.00 37.50
(8.20) (27.22) (12.07) (14.49) (0.00) (17.12)
Men, Non-Spanish 74.05 80.28 73.78 68.63 95.65 64.44
(1.67) (4.72) (2.29) (2.65) (4.25) (4.12)
Total 63.73 75.32 62.20 61.51 84.51 54.49
(1.06) (2.81) (1.69) (1.80) (4.29) (2.82)
Northeast Region: Ucayali/Loreto/Huanuco
States of Emergency Non-States of Emergency
Army Navy Police Army Navy Police
Women, Spanish 76.00 50.00 20.00 52.00 0.00 0.00
(8.54) (25.00) (17.89) (9.99) (0.00) (0.00)
Women, Non-Spanish 63.64 66.67 0.00 52.63 0.00 0.00
(10.26) (27.22) (0.00) (11.45) (0.00) (0.00)
Men, Spanish 74.53 64.71 47.83 77.21 53.13 42.86
(3.43) (8.20) (10.42) (3.60) (8.82) (10.80)
Men, Non-Spanish 68.81 83.33 33.33 67.69 63.64 40.00
(4.44) (7.61) (11.11) (5.80) (14.50) (21.91)
Total 68.72 72.97 28.36 67.08 45.10 32.69
(2.22) (5.16) (5.51) (2.62) (6.97) (6.51)
Note: standard errors in parentheses
Second, we look at search patterns and the probability of guilt given search.
As shown in Table 5, the intensity of search across most groups increased during
the states of emergency, implying that fewer successful cases should be encoun-
tered.14 Let’s consider the South Central region first. In this region, all groups
14Recall that agents of the state take into consideration the probability of punishing a guilty
person while searching. This would aﬀect the overall level of search only.
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significantly increased search of non-Spanish speakers during states of emergency.
Our models predict that all groups should decrease killing given search during
states of emergency. Looking at Table 6, we see that the probability of being
killed by the Army for non-Spanish speaking women is 60.64% in non-states of
emergency and 55.79% in states of emergency. So, the probability of killing has
gone down, as predicted. However, this does not hold for the Police and the Navy.
The probability of being killed by the Police goes up, but not significantly, and the
probability of being killed by the Navy is 25.00% in non-states of emergency and
increases significantly to 90.63% in states of emergency. This behavior towards
non-Spanish speaking women is not consistent with our models of statistical dis-
crimination. By contrast, the behavior of the Army, Navy and Police towards
non-Spanish speaking men is consistent.
In the Northeast region, there is less behavior that is inconsistent with sta-
tistical discrimination. For example, search does not increase during states of
emergency for any group by any agent, and killing given search does not change.
The only exception to this is for non-Spanish speaking men. In this case, the
Army, Navy and Police all increase search of non-Spanish speaking men during
states of emergency, however there is no significant decrease in killing given search.
Statistical discrimination would predict that killing given search should decline.
Third, we look at search and probability of guilt given search within a state of
emergency or a non-state of emergency (θ fixed). Looking at the South Central
region, Table 5 shows that there is an ordering of search. Given a θ, the Army
searches more than the Police, and the Police search more than the Navy.15 We
would, therefore, expect monotonicity in killing given search across agents of the
state for a fixed θ. For example, looking at states of emergency, the Army kills
significantly fewer women than the Navy, but it kills siginficantly more Spanish-
speaking men. Also, the Navy kills significantly more women than the Police,
but there is no significant diﬀerent for men. The Police kill significantly more
non-Spanish speaking women than the Army, but not for other groups. These
switches across groups for diﬀerent agents cannot be explained by our models of
statistical discrimination. Indeed, this result is not even consistent with a model
of crime minimization (as in Dominitz and Knowles, 2006).
Looking now at the Northeast region, we also see some patterns that are
inconsistent with our model. In states of emergency, the Army searches more
Spanish speakers than the Navy, but there is no significant diﬀerence in killing
given search. In non-states of emergency, the Army also searches Spanish speakers
15The only exception is for Spanish-speaking women in non-states of emergency.
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significantly more than the Navy, and the Army kills significantly more Spanish
speakers than the Navy. None of this behavior is consistent with our models.
In sum, we observe some behavior by the Army, Navy and Police that is
inconsistent with statistical discrimination. This occurs in both regions and is
slightly stronger in the South Central region where the civil war was the most
intense and earlier. In this area, most of the discrimination is aimed towards
non-Spanish speakers, especially women.
5.3. Robustness
A concern with the results of the previous section is that they are based on the
subsample of acts for which covariate data is available. This section restricts
the analysis only to gender and region since this data is available for almost all
observations. Table 7 presents the results for the intensity of search and the
probabibility of being killed given search. We confirm some of the general trends.
Search increases during states of emergency but is more pronounced in the South
Central region than in the Northeast. All these diﬀerences are significant with the
exception of the Navy in the Northeast region.
18
Table 7
Intensity of Search and Probability of Being Killed Given Search
South Central Region: Ayacucho/Huancavelica
States of Emergency Non-States of Emergency
Army Navy Police Army Navy Police
Probability of Search
Women 0.26 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Men 0.66 0.16 0.37 0.31 0.13 0.16
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Probability of Being Killed Given Search
Women 56.80 72.97 57.95 50.56 58.33 5.39
(1.99) (5.16) (3.72) (3.73) (14.23) (3.24)
Men 66.23 75.00 63.13 64.73 89.83 54.43
(1.25) (3.51) (1.88) (2.01) (3.93) (3.24)
Northeast Region: Ucayali/Loreto/Huanuco
States of Emergency Non-States of Emergency
Army Navy Police Army Navy Police
Probability of Search
Women 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Men 0.24 0.10 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Probability of Being Killed given Search
Women 65.82 55.56 7.69 51.61 0.00 20.00
(5.34) (16.56) (7.39) (6.35) (0.00) (12.65)
Men 67.81 75.36 31.67 71.43 56.86 35.56
(2.40) (5.19) (6.00) (2.73) (6.94) (7.14)
Note: standard errors in parentheses
As before, we find patterns that are diﬃcult to reconcile with statistical dis-
crimination. In the South Central region, we see that while the Police search in
the same intensity as the Navy during non-states of emergency, the proportion of
women being killed given search is significantly higher for the Navy. This pattern
is also at odds with the fact that the Army searches women more intensely than
the Police in these periods but kills more. We also observe that during states of
emergency, the Police search women about three times less frequently than the
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Army, but the cases of people killed given search is no diﬀerent. Notice also the
positive correlation between the intensity of search of women and the probability
of being killed as we pass from non-states of emergency to states of emergency.
Compared to the disaggregated results for the Northeast region, the evidence
for this region from Table 7 gives stronger evidence at odds with statistical dis-
crimination against women. The Army searchs women more intensely than the
Navy and the Police both in and out of states of emergency. However, the Army
kills a larger proportion of women given search. This evidence is not consistent
with either maximization of succesful searches nor minimization of crime.
6. Conclusions
Diﬀerences by race and class permeate social relations in the market and in the
political scene. One expects to see these crevasses most clearly whenever the rule of
law vanishes. Civil wars, conflicts and catastrophes therefore provide an excellent
opportunity to assess the nature and extent of discrimination. Using a unique data
set on human rights violations collected by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, we find that the pattern of violence cannot be reconciled with current
models of statistical discrimination. This is true even if we consider diﬀerent
rationales behind the exercise of violence.
We find several key patterns in the data. There was clearly diﬀerential treat-
ment across groups by agents of the state. Men and non-Spanish speakers were
more likely to be killed and searched by any agent of the state. This result holds
in periods of martial law and periods without martial law. We exploit changes in
institutional environment to then test the nature of discrimination. In particular,
we find that behavior towards non-Spanish speakers, especially women, cannot be
reconciled with theories of statistical discrimination and seems to be driven by
taste-based discrimination. This was particularly pronounced in the South Cen-
tral region of the country where the terrorist activity was most pronounced and
earlier.
The behavior we observe in this extreme setting is revealing. Wars are periods
of time in which emotions are raw and people respond on instinct. That we observe
patterns of behavior inconsistent with statistical discrimination suggests that there
are underlying sentiments of animus towards certain segments of the population.
We expect this would be diﬃcult to observe outside of these extreme periods
of time, especially since many of these groups may not normally interact with
one another. While perhaps not blatantly obvious, if these underlying sentiments
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exist, they may still manifest themselves in diﬀerential hiring practices, segregated
neighborhoods, or limited educational opportunities.
Designing policies to address these sentiments is more challenging. If dif-
ferential treatment were due to incorrect beliefs on behavior, accurate, credible
information on behavior might be all that is needed to mitigate this. However, if
diﬀerential tratment is due to animus, then this should be taken into account. Un-
derstanding the source of diﬀerential treatment is the first step towards designing
successful policies aimed at giving equal opportunities across groups.
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